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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Jesse Ray Still appeals the denial of his motion to suppress evidence found in his car after
a police officer stopped him for a traffic violation. Mr. Still claims the officer prolonged his
detention, in violation of the Fourth Amendment, when the officer deviated from the purpose of
the traffic stop to make a call to request a K-9 unit, first, instead of running the license and
registration checks. The State, below, offered no alternative reason for the period of delay but
asserted that the deviation was a “de minimis thing,” and because the officer got right back to
work, there was no Fourth Amendment violation. The district court came up with its own
hypothesis to justify the period of delay: the district court found that while making his call to the
K-9 unit, the officer was waiting on a second officer to seat himself before starting to run the
license and registration checks. On that basis, the court concluded the call to K-9 unit did not
prolong the stop.
On appeal, Mr. Still argues the State failed to carry its burden to show the duration of the
stop was justified, and that the district court’s contrary factual findings are clearly erroneous and
its legal conclusions are inconsistent with controlling precedent. The district court’s order
denying Mr. Still’s suppression motion should be reversed.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The evidence presented at the suppression hearing 1 established the following facts.
Sandpoint Police Officer Eric Clark pulled over the Chevrolet Trailblazer Mr. Still was driving,
having observed the vehicle speeding. (R., p.120; Tr., p.8, L.13 -p.9, L.24; Ex., 0:01-30.) A

1

second officer, Reserve Officer Kingery, was riding with Officer Clark at the time. (Tr., p.11,
Ls.1-3; See generally, Ex.) After stopping the vehicle, Officer Clark walked up to the driver’s
side and asked Mr. Still for his license, insurance, and registration documents. (R., p.12; Tr., p.9,
Ls.21-24; Ex., 0:35-55.) While Mr. Still was locating those documents within his vehicle,
Officer Clark used his portable radio to make his first call to a K-9 officer. (R., p.121; Tr., p.13,
Ls.10-26; p.14, Ls.9-19; Ex., 1:25.) Officer Clark testified he had no reason to suspect Mr. Still
of criminal activity at that time, and the call was “just routine.” (Tr., p.10, Ls.9-13.) Mr. Still
eventually located the requested documents and handed them to Officer Clark. (Ex., 1:35.)
Officer Clark examined the documents, questioned Mr. Still about the expired registration, then
gave the insurance paper back to Mr. Still. (R., p.121; Ex., 1:35-2:15.)
Officer Clark returned to his patrol car with Mr. Still’s documents in hand and sat down
in the driver’s seat. (R., pp.121, 126; Ex., 2:15-30.) He did not immediately begin the license
and registration checks, however. Instead, because he had not received a response to his initial
call to the K-9 officer, the “first thing” Officer Clark did was pick up his in-car radio to make a
second call to the K-9 officer. (Tr., p.16, L.5-8; Ex., 2:25-35.) While Officer Clark was making
this call, the second officer, Officer Kingery, entered the patrol vehicle and sat himself in the
passenger seat. (R., pp.121, 127; Ex., 2:25-35.) During this call, and after the second officer
was fully seated, Officer Clark asked the K-9 officer over the radio, “are you and your partner
available?” (R., p.121; Ex., 2:35.) Officer Clark confirmed that, while he made this second call,
he was not doing anything else. (Tr., p.16, L.9-11; see Ex.2:25-35.)

1

The State called Officer Eric Clark as its only witness and the parties stipulated to the
admission of the video. (Tr., p.6, L.1 – p.7, L.1.) No other testimony or documentary evidence
was admitted or offered. (See generally, Tr.)
2

After Officer Clark finished the call to the K-9 officer, only then did he begin to run the
license checks. (R., pp.121, 127; Ex., 2:35.) With Officer Kingery looking on, Officer Clark
placed Mr. Still’s license next to the computer screen and began the license checks. (R., p.122;
Ex., 2:01-55.)

And after he had completed the license checks, Officer Clark pulled out

Mr. Still’s registration document and began running a check on that. (Ex.10:00-10.) Officer
Clark, alone, handled the license and registration documents, operated the computer’s mouse and
keyboard, and printed the tickets. (See Ex., 2:55–13:00.) Officer Clark’s only comments to
Officer Kingery during the license and registration checks, aside from asking if he’d erased
information, were requests to keep an eye on Mr. Still, and later, to hand over a roll of paper for
the computer. (See generally, Ex. 0:01 – 13:00.)
While Officer Clark and Officer Kingery were still seated inside the patrol car, the K-9
unit officer arrived and deployed his drug dog. (R., p.121.) The dog alerted on Mr. Still’s
vehicle, and during the ensuring search, the police found drug evidence and a gun. (Tr., p.11,
L.7 – p.12, L.4.) Regarding Officer Kingery’s participation in the encounter, Officer Clark
testified that Kingery was riding with him and that both officers had conducted the hand search
of the vehicle.

(Tr., p.11, Ls.1-3.)

The State provided no further explanation of Officer

Kingery’s role during the stop. (See generally, Tr.)
Based on the evidence found in the car, Mr. Still was charged with possession of a
controlled substance and the unlawful possession of a firearm. (R., p.126.) Mr. Still filed a
motion to suppress the evidence claiming Officer Clark violated the Fourth Amendment when he
deviated from the purpose of the traffic stop and made the second call to the K-9 offer, 2 which
prolonged his detention. (R., pp.82-97.) Mr. Still pointed out that Officer Clark made the call
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after being handed Mr. Still’s license and registration documents, and after being seated back in
his patrol car, instead of beginning the license checks; “the first thing” Officer Clark did was
pick up the in-car radio microphone and make the call to the K-9 Officer. (R., pp.96-97; Tr.,
p.17, L.8 – p.18, L.12.) Mr. Still argued that under the controlling precedent of State v. Linze,
161 Idaho 605, 607 (2016), the officer’s unrelated inquiry “added time” to the traffic stop and
unlawfully prolonging his detention. (R., pp.96-97; Tr., p.17, L.8 – p.18, L.12.)
The prosecutor conceded he had not fully read the Idaho Supreme Court’s decision in
Linze, and argued,
the only deviation there would be – is that very small amount of time that [Officer
Clark] went into the patrol vehicle, placed that call a second time and then went
back to work. … So, from the State’s perspective, this is a very de minimis thing.
I mean, you know, we’re talking about seconds in this case …
(Tr., p.19, L.6 - p.21, L.13).
Mr. Still replied by pointing out that, under Linze and the U.S. Supreme Court’s holding
in Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. _, 135 S.Ct. 1609 (2015), any time added to the stop that
is not justified by reasonable suspicion violates the Fourth Amendment, and that there is no
exception for a so-called de minimis violation. (Tr., p.22, L.13 – p.23, L.12.)
The district court denied the motion. The district court found that Officer Clark took
approximately ten seconds to make the call to the K-9 Unit, and that he made this call after he
was seated in his patrol car and before he began to run the license checks. (R., p.122.) However,
the district court concluded that Officer Clark “never abandoned the purpose of the traffic stop”
(R., p.125) and that making the call “did not prolong the stop” (R., p.126). Although the State
offered no reason for Officer Clark’s ten-second delay, and although Officer Clark himself

2

The parties stipulated the stop was lawful and the search was warrantless. (Tr., p.6, L.18 – p7,
L.9.)
4

testified he was doing nothing else at the time other than making the call, the district court
justified the Officer Clark’s actions, explaining:
The Court finds that the few seconds Clark used to make the call did not prolong
the stop because during that time Kingery was entering the vehicle, being seated,
and as the call concluded, both officers began working as a unit to run and review
the status of Still’s license and registration.
(R., p.126.) (Emphasis added.)
Following the denial of his motion, Mr. Still entered a conditional plea of guilty reserving
his right to appeal the district court’s decision. (Tr., p.37, Ls.12-23; p.40, Ls.10-12; R., p.142.)
The district court sentenced him to four years, with two fixed, and retained jurisdiction.
(Tr., p.61, Ls.13-17; R., p.172.) Mr. Still filed a timely Notice of Appeal. (R., p.177.)
On appeal, Mr. Still argues that the district court’s conclusion that Officer Clark did not
unlawfully prolong the stop is based on its erroneous findings that are not supported by the
record, and on its erroneous reasoning that is inconsistent with controlling precedent.

5

ISSUE
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Still’s motion to suppress?
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Still’s Motion To Suppress

A.

Introduction
The district court erroneously concluded that Officer Clark’s call to request the K-9 unit

did not unlawfully prolong the traffic stop. Mr. Still claimed below, as he does now on appeal,
that Officer Clark deviated from the purpose of the traffic stop when, instead of beginning the
license and registration checks, he first made a call to the K-9 officer, and that the call
measurably prolonged his detention in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights.
It is undisputed that Officer Clark stopped Mr. Still, obtained his license and registration
documents, and returned with them to his patrol car. It is also undisputed that Officer Clark did
not immediately run the license and registration checks, but that instead, the first thing he did
was pick up the patrol car’s radio microphone and made a ten-second call to the K-9 unit. It is
also undisputed that Officer Clark did not begin the license and registration checks until after
that call had ended.
The State, below, acknowledged there was a brief deviation from the traffic stop when
the officer made the call, and the State offered no alternative account for the period of delay;
Officer Clark, himself, confirmed he was doing nothing else during that time. Instead, the State
claimed the deviation was “a very de minimis thing” that should not be held unreasonable under
the Fourth Amendment. In denying suppression, the district court ignored this evidence and the
State’s concession and concluded, erroneously, that Officer Clark “never abandoned the purpose
of the stop,” and that although he made the call, “the call did not prolong the stop.”
On appeal, Mr. Still argues that the district court’s decision is not supported by its own
factual findings and is not supported by the record. The district court’s hypothesis that Officer
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Clark’s delay in beginning the license checks was, or could have been, caused by his waiting for
Officer Kingery – rather than by his making the call to the K-9 officer – is simply not supported
by the evidence. As discussed below, the video shows Officer Kingery was fully seated before
Officer Clark had asked for the K-9 unit. On the record made by the State in this case, there is
nothing that shows Officer Clark was in fact waiting for the second officer to begin conducting
the license checks, or if he had been, that such a wait expedited the license checks or otherwise
served the mission of the traffic stop. The district court’s denial of suppression should be
reversed.
B.

Standard Of Review
Review of a trial court’s decision granting or denying a suppression motion is bifurcated.

The appellate court accepts the trial court’s findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous.
State v. Linze, 161 Idaho 605, 607 (2016). However, the appellate court will “freely review the
application of constitutional principles in light of the facts found.” Id.
C.

The State Failed To Carry Its Burden Of Showing That Officer Clark Was Diligently
Pursuing The Traffic Stop During The Time Of His Call To The K-9 Officer
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides that “[t]he right of the

people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches
and seizures, shall not be violated.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. Evidence obtained in violation of
Fourth Amendment protections is subject to the exclusionary rule, which requires the
suppression of both primary evidence obtained as a direct result of an illegal search or seizure,
and evidence later discovered and found to be derivative of an illegality, that is, “fruit of the
poisonous tree.” See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484-85 (1963); State v. Guzman,
122 Idaho 981, 988-98 (1992).
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“The seizure of a vehicle’s occupants in order to investigate a traffic violation is a
‘reasonable seizure’ under the Fourth Amendment so long as the seizing officer had reasonable
suspicion that a violation had occurred.” Linze, 161 Idaho at 608 (citing Rodriguez, 575 U.S. _,
135 S.Ct. at 1614). “A seizure justified only by a police-observed traffic violation … becomes
unlawful if it is prolonged beyond the time reasonably required to complete the mission of the
traffic stop.” Rodriguez, 575 U.S._, 135 S.Ct. at 1612. A police officer’s traffic mission
includes checking the driver’s license and inspecting the automobile’s registration and proof of
insurance, and officer safety measures. Id., 135 S.Ct. at 1616. A drug dog sniff, like other
measures directed at detecting crime, are not part of the officer’s traffic mission. Id., 135 S.Ct. at
1615.
While an officer may conduct certain unrelated inquiries during an otherwise lawful
traffic stop, “he may not do so in a way that prolongs the stop…” Rodriguez, 575 U.S. _, 135
S.Ct. at 1615. Nor may an officer “incrementally prolong” a traffic stop in order to conduct an
unrelated criminal investigation.

Id.

“If an officer can complete traffic-based inquiries

expeditiously, then that is the amount of time reasonably required to complete the stop’s
mission.” Id. (internal brackets omitted) (emphasis added.) Ultimately, if an officer makes
unrelated inquiries or investigations the officer inevitably3 “adds time to” the traffic stop, and,
unless the added time is justified by its own reasonable suspicion, the prolonging violates the
Fourth Amendment. Rodriguez, 575 U.S. _, 135 S.Ct. at 1616; Linze, 161 Idaho at 608. “This
rule is both broad and inflexible. It applies to all extensions of traffic stops including those that

3

The Idaho Supreme Court in Linze expressly adopted the reasoning that any deviation from the
original purpose of the traffic stop “will inevitably lengthen the time needed to complete the
original purpose of the traffic stop, and will result in a stop that exceeds the time need to handle
the matter for which the stop was made.” 161 Idaho at 608. (emphasis added) (internal citations
and brackets omitted.)
9

could reasonably be considered de minimis.” Linze, 161 Idaho at 608 (citing Rodriguez, 575
U.S. _, 135 S.Ct. at 1615-16.

1.

Officer Clark’s Call To The K-9 Officer Was Unrelated To The Purpose Of The
Traffic Stop

There is no question that Officer Clark deviated from the mission of the traffic stop when
he made the second call to the K-9 officer. Officer Clark’s inquiry, “are you and your partner
available?” was not part of the officer’s traffic mission; it lacked any connection to roadway
safety or officer safety. See Rodriguez, 575 U.S._, 135 S. Ct. at 1615-16. The State, below,
acknowledged Officer Clark’s call was a deviation from the traffic stop. (Tr., p.19, Ls.6-19; p.20
Ls.6-7; p.11, Ls.7-13.) The district court found, and the record supports, that Officer Clark took
ten seconds to make the call, and that he made the call after he had reentered his patrol car, with
the license and registration documents in hand, but before he started running the license checks
on his computer. As described by the prosecutor, “the officer … reaches for and grabs that
microphone, that’s where the deviation, I guess, would start or the abandonment of his purpose
of the stop.” (Tr., p.21, Ls.14-18 (emphasis added).)
The remaining question presented by this case, then, is whether Officer Clark’s call to the
K-9 Officer “measurably prolonged the stop.”
2.

Officer Clark’s Call To The K-9 Officer Measurably Prolonged The Traffic Stop

The call to the K-9 officer made before running the license checks prolonged the stop,
unless Officer Clark was simultaneously engaged in some other permissible task that accounted
for this same period. However, Officer Clark testified he was not “doing anything else” while he
was calling the K-9 officer (see Tr., p.16, Ls.9-11), and the State, below, offered no alternative
account for this time period before Officer Clark began running the checks (see generally, Tr.).
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Indeed, the prosecutor conceded the call was, in his words, a “deviation” and an “abandonment”
of the purpose of the stop, but that this period was de minimis. (Tr., p.19, Ls.6-9; p.21, Ls.1118.)
3.

The District Court Erred In Concluding That The Call To The K-9 Officer Did
Not Prolong The Traffic Stop

The district court’s conclusion that the call did not prolong the stop ignores its own
findings and is inconsistent with the record, and cannot be reconciled with controlling precedent.
Although the district court correctly found the duration of this call was approximately ten
seconds (R., p.121), the court erred in concluding that Officer Clark “never abandoned the
purpose of the stop,” and that “the call did not prolong the stop.” (R., pp.125, 126.) There is no
“de minimis” exception to the Fourth Amendment and its requirement that a traffic stop not be
prolonged by unrelated inquiries and investigations. Rodriguez, 575 U.S. _, 135 S. Ct. at 1616;
Linze, 161 Idaho at 608. However, in reaching its conclusion, the district reasoned that, “during
that time [the second officer] Kingery was entering the vehicle, being seated, and as the call
concluded, both officers began working as a unit to run and review the status of Still’s license
and registration.” (R., p.126.) Although the district court described the somewhat coincidental
actions of the second officer (Kingery), the district court did not state why it believed those
actions justified Officer Clark to delay running the license check. Implicit in its ruling, however,
is a hypothetical reason that Officer Clark was waiting on the second officer before starting to
run the license check, and that this period of waiting was still “diligent” under the circumstances.
The district court’s reasoning is clearly erroneous to the extent it is based on factual findings that
are not supported by the record. Its reasoning is erroneous as a matter of law to the extent that it
conflicts with controlling precedent.
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It is clear from the record that Officer Clark had control of Mr. Still’s license and
registration documents, and that Officer Clark was in control of the patrol car’s computer and
radio. (See generally, Ex.0:01-10:00.) It is apparent that all of the activities necessary for
conducing the license check were within the control of Officer Clark. (See generally, Ex.0:0110:00.) The video demonstrates that Officer Clark was fully capable of undertaking the license
and registration checks. (See generally, Ex.0:01-10:00.) The State presented no evidence to
show the presence of the second officer, Kingery, was necessary for Officer Clark to start that
task, or that waiting for the second officer would otherwise expedite the completion of the traffic
stop’s mission. 4
Officer Clark’s own testimony does not support the district court’s hypothesis. Officer
Clark’s sole explanation for this period of time was to make the call from his in-car radio; he did
not testify, and the prosecutor did not argue, that Officer Clark was waiting on the reserve officer
before beginning the license check. (See generally, Tr.) On the contrary, Officer Clark testified
that while he was making the call to the K-9 officer, he was not doing anything else. (Tr., p.16,
Ls.9-12.) Not only was there a lack of any evidence to show Officer Clark had in fact waited for
the second officer, the State offered no evidence or argument that waiting for a second officer
before running a license check was objectively reasonable. Indeed, the State conceded in the
district court that the call prolonged the stop, but, having not read the controlling case law,
argued it was reasonable nonetheless. (Tr., p.18, L.14 – p.22, L.2.) In short, the only reason

4

In the present case, both officers remained in the patrol car for some ten minutes, until the K-9
unit officer arrived with his drug dog. (See generally, Ex.; R., p.122.)
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offered by the State for Officer Clark’s delay in beginning the license and registration checks,
and the only one for which there is sufficient evidence in the record, is that Officer Clark made a
call requesting the K-9 unit. (See generally, Tr.)
Moreover, even if a second officer was somehow necessary to run the license checks, the
evidence in this case shows that Officer Clark was not waiting for that second officer. The video
– which is the only evidence of what took place during the call – shows that the second officer,
Kingery, was fully seated and car door was closed, prior to Officer Clark asking the K-9 officer
whether he and his partner were available. (Ex., 2:25-35.) Thus, even if two officers were
needed in order to begin running the license checks, the record here demonstrates that the second
officer, Kingery, was actually waiting on Officer Clark. (Ex., 2:25-35.)
The district court’s rationale for the delay is not supported by the record and is
inconsistent with the controlling law.

The district court’s conclusion that there was no

prolonging rests, not on the evidence and arguments presented by the State, but on an alternative,
and hypothetical, reason that the license check was delayed because the second officer was not
yet seated next to Officer Clark.

The district court’s hypothetical reason for the delay is

contradicted by the record and cannot substitute for the evidence, or for the State’s concession
making the call to the K-9 officer was the reason for Officer Clark’s delay in running the license
check.

That call, though brief, measurably prolonged the stop, and, under the controlling

precedent, violated Mr. Still’s rights against unreasonable seizures. Suppression should have
been granted.
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CONCLUSION
Mr. Still asks this Court to reverse the district court’s denial of his suppression motion,
vacate his judgment of conviction, and remand his case to the district court for further
proceedings.
DATED this 19th day of November, 2018.

/s/ Kimberly A. Coster
KIMBERLY A. COSTER
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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